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Abstract 
SZAROWSKÁ, I.: Changes in taxation and their impact on economic growth in the 
European Union. 
The aim of the paper is to analyze changes in taxation and their impact on economic 
growth in the European Union. The analysis is performed on adjusted annual panel 
data of 24 European Union countries in a period 1995–2008. Panel regression 
with fixed effects is used as a basic method of research. The panel regression is based 
on analysis the effect of total tax quota changes on GDP growth in model 1, of changes 
in its components (social contribution, direct and indirect tax quotas) in model 2 and 
of personal and corporate income tax quota changes in model 3. Results of empirical 
tests verify statistically significant negative effect of tax burden on GDP growth. Total 
tax quota increased by 1% decreases the GDP growth rate by 0.29% in the same year. 
Estimations confirm a statistically significant negative effect of direct taxes on GDP 
growth as well. A cut in the direct tax quota by 1% raises the GDP growth rate 
by 0.43%. The model also presents a high negative impact of an increase 
in the corporate income tax quota on GDP growth (a value of the regression coefficient 
is minus 1.28%) expresses the high negative. The effect of social contribution quota 
on GDP growth is not statistically significant in any estimation.  
 
taxation, tax burden, economic growth, panel regression 
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Enlargement of the European Union and the globalization process significantly affect 
tax systems and fiscal policies of individual countries. The level and structure of tax 
burden is often discussed in the European Union. Economic theory suggests that 
differences in taxation may play a role in explaining differences in economic 
performance. Current economic development forces governments to find solutions 
how to support the economic growth and to consolidate public finance. There are 
different views of how this problem should be dealt with in general and also applied 
tools of individual countries have various forms – from ad hoc tax measures 
to substantial structural reforms. It is questionable whether the governments may affect 
the economic performance of countries through changes in taxation.  
The aim of the paper is to analyze changes in taxation and their impact on economic 
growth in the European Union. The analysis is performed on adjusted annual panel 
data of 24 EU countries in a period 1995–2008. Panel regression with fixed effects 
is used as a basic method of research. The paper is structured as follows: The first 
section of the paper introduces basic relations between taxation and the economic 
growth and the aim of paper. The second part provides a basic literature review. 
The third part presents methods and resources for modeling changes in taxation and 
their impact on economic growth in the European Union. The fourth section reports 
results and discussions of the estimation. The panel regression is based on analysis the 
effect of total tax quota changes on GDP growth in model 1, of changes in its 
components (social contribution, direct and indirect tax quotas) in model 2 and 
of corporate and personal income tax quota changes in model 3. The last section 
presents conclusions. 
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Literature review 
The theoretical effect of taxation on economic performance is not an obvious matter. 
A higher level of tax burden can be seen as a serious obstacle to sustained 
improvement of the economic level of the country. Scully (1991:93–96) says: “Taxes 
levied by government may have both positive and negative effects on economic 
growth. The value of economic resources and the ability to transform resources into 
output are greater to the degree that property is protected, roads and harbors are 
provided, and domestic tranquility is insured. Taxation beyond this level may have 
a negative effect. In modern times, many private goods are provided at public expense 
and direct income redistribution takes place on a large scale. At some level of taxation, 
resources employed in the public sector are less than in the private sector and resources 
escape into informal or underground economy – which diminish economic growth.” 
Both neoclassical and Keynesian theoretical models, for example, predict that higher 
taxes reduce economic activity, even though there is less agreement on the exact 
mechanisms that generate this result. On the other hand, taxes may be a benefit 
for the economy because the taxes are the basic source for financing public goods and 
services, and in this way can increase the living standards and wealth of the whole 
society. If collected taxes are used efficiently, provided public services can increase 
productivity of human and fixed capital in the private sector and promote long-term 
economic growth. 
There is voluminous literature on the effects of taxes on the economy and its rate 
of growth (Leibfritz, Thornton a Bibbee: 1997, Barro: 1991, Slemrod: 1995). However, 
using statistical data for comparing levels of taxation and economic performance also 
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does not provide unequivocal conclusions. We can find countries with high economic 
performance, which have a low tax burden (e.g. United States), but also countries that 
have high economic performance with high tax burden (e.g. Scandinavian countries).  
But there are many studies which present negative relationships between taxes and 
economic growth, and recommend lowering tax rates. Plosser (1992) finds 
a significant negative correlation between the level of taxes on income and profits 
(as a share of GDP) and growth of real per capita GDP. King and Rebelo (1990) 
simulate changes in the income tax by applying an endogenous growth model and find 
that an increase from 20 per cent to 30 per cent reduces the rate of growth by 
2 percentage points. Scully (2000) claims that countries in which government takes 
more than 43% of national income in the form of taxes could collect more revenue 
by lowering their tax rates. Further, tax rates anywhere close to 43% have devastating 
effects on economic growth. Hill (2008) estimated the growth–maximizing size 
of states for the United States in 1960–1990 was between 9% and 29% of GDP. Also 
Romero-Ávila and Strauch (2008) state that government consumption and direct 
taxation negatively affect growth rates of GDP per capita in the EU15 in the last 
40 years. Johansson et al. (2008: 2) investigate the design of tax structures to promote 
economic growth. “Corporate taxes are found to be most harmful for growth, followed 
by personal income taxes, and then consumption taxes. Recurrent taxes on immovable 
property appear to have the least impact.” Lee and Gordon (2005) explore how 
tax policies in fact affect a country's growth rate, using cross-country data during 
1970–1997. The coefficient estimates suggest that a cut in the corporate tax rate by 
10% will raise the annual growth rate by 1 to 2 percentage points.  
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Karras and Furceri (2009) examine the effects of changes in taxes on economic 
growth. Using annual data from 1965 to 2003 for a panel of 19 European economies, 
the results show that the effect of an increase in taxes on real GDP per capita 
is negative and persistent. An increase in the total tax rate by 1% of GDP has an effect 
on real GDP per capita of minus 0.5% to minus 1% in the long run. The findings also 
imply that increases in social security contributions or taxes on goods and services 
have larger negative effects on per capita output than increases in income tax.  
 
Methods and Resources 
It should be noted that the goal of this empirical analysis is not to find the ideal model 
describing the behavior illustrated by the variables, but a statistically significant 
correlation between explanatory (the tax burden which is expressed as the tax quota) 
and explaining variable (economic performance which is measured by GDP growth). 
We use the panel data and calculations which are made in the program Eviews. 
Methodology of the analysis is based on study of Plojhar and Tomšík (2004), 
who analyzed the influence of taxation on economic performance in OECD countries 
(1972–2002). We use panel data as panel data have both cross-sectional and time 
series dimensions and the application of regression models to fit econometric models 
are more complex than those for simple cross-sectional data sets. As Dougherty (2007) 
and Cipra (2008) wrote, there are several reasons for the increasing interest in panel 
data sets. An important one is that their use may offer a solution to the problem of bias 
caused by unobserved heterogeneity, a common problem is the adaptability of models 
with cross-sectional data sets. A second reason is that it may be possible to exploit 
panel data sets to reveal dynamics that are difficult to detect with cross-sectional data. 
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A third attraction of panel data sets is that they often have very large numbers 
of observations. Panel data modelling combines elements of time series analysis and 
elements of regression analysis.  
We performed both fixed effects and random effects regressions before analysis. 
A Durbin–Wu–Hausman test indicated significant differences in the coefficients 
so model with fixed effects is used in the paper. A panel model with fixed effects can 
be formally written as:  
yit = αi + β'Xit + εit, i = 1, 2, ..., N, t = 1, 2, ..., T,  (1) 
where yit depends on a set of K explanatory variables xit and the constants are specific 
to the i–th unit (country) at time t, at the same time but are constant. β ' is the vector 
dimension 1xK constants and αi is a constant representing the effects of those 
variables, which are characteristic of the i–th observation. εit error component 
represents non-significant effects of variables inherent in the i-team observations and 
a given time interval. Furthermore, we assume it does not correlate with the vector xit, 
for all the i and t, and it comes from independent identical distribution with zero mean 
and constant dispersion. This model is often referred to as a basic model representing 
the structure of panel data.  
The panel consists of 24 EU members – Bulgaria, Romania and Malta were excluded 
due to lack of data. Basic panel model identifiers are country i and time t. The paper 
uses adjusted annual data on total tax quota and its sub-components (direct taxes, 
indirect taxes, social contribution, personal income taxes, corporate income taxes) 
from Eurostat. Annual cyclically adjusted data on GDP at market prices are taken from 
Eurostat and they are based on an accrual basis. Expressing GDP in PPS (purchasing 
power standards) eliminates differences in price levels between countries, and 
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calculations on a per head basis allows for the comparison of economies significantly 
different in absolute size. Tab. I presents basic variables and their descriptive statistics. 
All taxes are expressed as % of GDP and they are understood as a tax quota (TTOT – 
total tax quota, TDIR – direct taxes, TIND – indirect taxes, TSC – social contribution, 
CIT – corporate income taxes, PIT – personal income taxes).  
I: Descriptive statistics of variables (312 observations) 
Variable   Mean  Median  Maximum  Minimum  Std. dev. 
GDP  19891  19350  69300  4500  9480 
TTOT  37.734  37.206  51.822  25.766  6.002 
TDIR  12.446  10.949  31.922  6.007  5.238 
TIND  13.861  13.570  19.952  10.151  1.828 
TSC  11.484  12.135  18.618  0.9961  3.780 
CIT  2.997  2.801  8.028  0.522  1.323 
PIT  8.559  7.167  26.308  2.502  4.789 
Source: Author’s calculations based on data from Eurostat 
 
Model specification 
A causal relationship between the variables can be simply written: 
GDP = f (TDIR, TIND, TSC)  (2) 
This means that the amount of GDP is the result of the influence of individual 
components of tax quota. It is necessary to test the stationary time series before 
starting econometric analysis due to the assumes of panel regression. For this purpose 
panel unit root tests are used.  A stationary time series is required because any variable 
which stochastically permanently departs from its mean value cannot be affected 
by long period variable, which returns to its mean value (effect may be only in a short 
term). Recent literature suggests that panel-based unit root tests have higher power 
than unit root tests based on individual time series. Panel unit root tests are similar, but 
not identical, to unit root tests carried out on a single series (Verbeek, 2000). We used 
panel unit root tests (Levin, Lin and Chu, Breitung, Im, Pesaran and Shin, Fisher-type 
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tests using ADF and PP tests) and they identified non- stationary of all level data. 
Therefore, it is not possible to analyze the effect of taxation on economic performance 
based on level data. Next we calculated and tested the first difference of time series 
with the aim to comply assumptions of panel regression. The first difference (absolute 
change in values) of GDP is expressed as: 
∆GDP = GDP - GDP(-1)  (3) 
Analogically, we used the same indication and procedure for all the remaining time 
series (∆TTOT, ∆TDIR, ∆TIND, ∆TSC, ∆CIT, ∆PIT). We also calculated and tested the 
first difference of logarithmic data for the GDP (rate of growth): 
TR_GDP = (lnGDP - lnGDP(-1))100 (4) 
Panel unit root tests confirm that all time series are stationary at the first difference 
I(1). For details see Szarowská (2010). All time series are stationary even at 1% level 
of significance and can be used for modelling changes of GDP growth depending 
on changes of the tax quota and its components1. 
 
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION – IMPACT OF TAX CHANGES ON GROWTH 
Time series of growth rate and differences of all variables are stationary and therefore 
they can be used for panel regression. The panel regression is based on analysis the 
effect of total tax quota changes on GDP growth in model 1, of changes in its 
components (social contribution, direct and indirect taxes) in model 2 and of CIT and 
PIT changes in model 3. 
 
 
                                                           
1
 Results of tests are available on request. 
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Model 1 
Model 1 is estimated in a very simple form: 
TR_GDPit = αi + β ∆TTOTit + εit, (5) 
where TR_GDPit is rate of growth GDP and it depends on a first difference of total tax 
quota TTOTit. αi is a constant representing the effects of those variables, which are 
characteristic of the i–th observation. We suppose that GDP growth depends only on 
total tax quota changes (∆TTOT). 
II: Specification of model 1 
Variable  Coefficient Std. Error t–Statistic Prob. 
Constant  5.686536  0.156343 36.37216 0.0000 
TR_TTOT  -0.128693  0.060859 -1.796245 0.0736 
  Effects Specification      
R–squared  0.357248        
Adjusted R–squared 0.298594  
Durbin–Watson stat  1.958847        
Source: Author’s calculations  
The equation shows the negative effect between variables: total tax quota increased by 
1% decreases the GDP growth rate by 0.29 percentage point in the same year. The 
estimate is significant at the 10% level, results are not significant on standard used 5% 
level. The Durbin–Watson statistic (1951) is a test statistic used to detect the presence 
of autocorrelation in the residuals, value equal 2 indicates no autocorrelation. 
The value of the Durbin–Watson test is 1.961 so residues are not autocorrelated. 
Adjusted R–squared is 0.2982. 
 
 
 
 
                                                           
2
 The estimations with lags does not confirm statistically significant effect of tax changes on GDP growth 
at standard levels. Detailed results of estimation are available on reguest. 
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Model 2 
Model 1 is very simplistic as total tax quota does not reflect changes of its individual 
components. Model 2 reflects changes of tax quota components: direct taxes TDIR3, 
indirect taxes TIND4 and social contribution TSC on GDP growth.  
TR_GDPit = αi + β1 ∆TDIRit + β2∆TINDit + β3 ∆TSCit + εit, (6) 
III: Specification of model 2 
Variable  Coefficient  Std. Error  t–Statistic  Prob.  
Constant 5.662490 0.157107 36.04221 0.0000 
∆TDIR -0.431771 0.222504 -1.940508 0.0434 
∆TIND 0.285605 0.286615 0.996477 0.3199 
∆TSC -0.233530 0.352001 -0.663435 0.5076 
  Effects Specification      
Adjusted R–squared 0.299303    
 Durbin–Watson stat  1.981283       
Source: Author’s calculations  
The results in Tab. III express the negative effect of direct taxes and social 
contribution on GDP growth and the positive impact of indirect tax changes on GDP 
growth. The effect of direct taxes is statistically significant, while other variables are 
not statistically significant at standard level. The coefficient suggests that a cut in the 
direct taxes by one percentage point raises the growth rate by a 0.43 percentage point. 
Due to the values of the adjusted coefficient of determination residues are not 
autocorrelated. Fig. 1 shows how the actual data correspond to the estimated values. 
 
 
                                                           
3
 Direct taxes are imposed on a concrete subject, which cannot transfer this tax on somebody else, e. g. 
personal and corporate income taxes.  
4
 Indirect taxes are value added tax, consumer tax, customs and other indirect taxes. Indirect taxes are 
imposed on a concrete subject as well, but it can transfer them on some other subject. 
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1: Effect of tax quota components on GDP growth 
 
Source: Author’s calculations  
We also calculated estimations with time lag. We used information criteria (Akaike 
info criterion, Schwarz criterion and Hannan–Quinn criterion) and it seems that the 
model with 1 year lag is the most appropriate. Equation with 1 year lag has following 
form:  
TR_GDPit = αi + β1 ∆TDIRit-1 + β2∆TINDit-1 + β3 ∆TSCit-1 +εit (7) 
IV: Specification of model 2 with 1 year lag 
 Variable  Coefficient  Std. Error  t–Statistic  Prob.  
Constant 5.638532 0.168810 33.40173 0.0000 
∆TDIR(-1) -0.442761 0.246102 -1.799096 0.0733 
∆TIND(-1) 0.646778 0.306936 2.107206 0.0362 
∆TSC(-1) -0.220433 0.375224 -0.587469 0.5574 
  Effects Specification      
Adjusted R–squared  0.299392    
Durbin–Watson stat  2.000670       
Source: Author’s calculations  
An estimation with 1 year lag reflects statistically significant negative effects of direct 
taxes on GDP growth at 10% level and positive effect of indirect taxes on GDP growth 
at 5% level. Regression coefficients are higher than in the previous equation: 0.65% 
and –0.44%. Cross-sectional nature and persistence of taxes can be one of the reasons 
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explaining this development. Indirect taxes have impact on demand and positively 
effect on economic growth. Direct taxes can have an impact on GDP by affecting 
labour utilization and labour productivity or both. However, it is generally difficult 
to assess the overall effect of the tax changes on GDP. For example, changes in any 
single tax may simultaneously affect several determinants of GDP. The effects 
of changes in taxation often depend also on the design of other policies and 
institutions. Thus, the negative effect of labour taxes on employment is often 
dependent on wage setting institutions which determine e.g. minimum wages, which 
negatively affect labour cost and then GDP growth.  
Model 3 
Model 2 confirmed statistically significant negative effect of direct taxes on GDP 
growth. Model 3 is focused on analyzing the effect of changes in corporate (CIT) and 
personal income taxes (PIT) on GDP growth. The equation takes the following form:  
TR_GDPit = αi + β1 ∆PITit + β2 ∆CITit + β3 ∆TINDit + β4 ∆TSCit + εit (8) 
V: Specification of model 3 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t–Statistic Prob.  
Constant 5.579721 0.156320 35.69423 0.0000 
∆PIT -0.450514 0.366721 -1.228495 0.2204 
∆CIT -1.283417 0.339171 -3.783980 0.0002 
∆TIND 0.415856 0.284175 1.463382 0.1446 
∆TSC -0.356937 0.349241 -1.022036 0.3077 
 Effects Specification   
Adjusted R–squared 0.324618    
Durbin–Watson stat 1.979723    
Source: Author’s calculations 
Results in Tab. V show the negative correlation between corporate income taxes and 
GDP growth even at 1% level. The regression coefficient (– 1.28) confirms high 
negative impact of an increase in the corporate income taxes on GDP growth. Other 
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variables are not statistically significant in this estimation. Fig. 2 shows how the actual 
data correspond to the estimated values (fitted). 
2: GDP growth as a result of tax changes  
 
Source : EViews 6 
We again used information criteria (Akaike info criterion, Schwarz criterion and 
Hannan–Quinn criterion) for identification. The most appropriate time lag and model 
with 2 year lags seem to be the most suitable. Estimation with 2 year lag has following 
form:  
TR_GDP = 5.011 - 1.024*∆CIT(-2) - 0.4710*∆PIT(-2) + 0.594*∆TIND(-2)  
– 0.417*∆TSC(-2) + εit (9) 
It confirms the statistically significant negative effect of corporate tax changes on GDP 
growth at standard level 5% level. The adjusted determination coefficient has a value 
of 20%, and a Durbin–Watson test (1.880) confirms no autocorrelation of residues. 
Other variables are not statistically significant. 
Economic theory suggests that differences in tax burden may play a role in explaining 
differences in economic performance. Nevertheless, it is generally difficult to assess 
the overall effect of the tax changes on GDP as, for example, changes in any single tax 
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may simultaneously affect several determinants of GDP and its growth. The effects 
of changes in taxation often depend also on the design of other policies and 
institutions. The empirical findings show that an increase in taxes has a negative effect 
on GDP growth. Founded regression coefficients are in line with conclusions of the 
studies of Scully (1991, 2000), Lee and Gordon (2005), Hill (2008), Romero-Ávila 
and Strauch (2008), Karras and Furceri (2009).  
Although founded regression coefficients are relatively high, the changes in tax burden 
should not be regarded as a single tool affecting the economic growth, as the GDP 
growth is influenced by many factors. Nevertheless, values of adjusted 
the determination coefficient (approximately 30%), are relatively high due to the 
complex nature of GDP growth.  
 
SUMMARY 
The paper analyzed the effect of tax changes on GDP growth using adjusted annual 
data for a panel of 24 European Union members in a period 1995–2008. We have used 
panel regression with fixed effects as a basic method of research. The panel regression 
is based on analysis the effect of total tax quota changes on GDP growth in model 1, of 
changes in its components (social contribution, direct and indirect taxes) in model 2 
and of corporate income tax quota and personal income tax quota changes in model 3. 
The empirical findings show that an increase in taxes has a negative effect on GDP 
growth. Founded regression coefficients are in line with conclusions of the studies of 
Scully (1991, 2000), Lee and Gordon (2005), Hill (2008), Romero–Ávila and Strauch 
(2008), Karras and Furceri (2009). The results of empirical tests verify statistically 
significant negative effect of tax burden on GDP growth. Total tax quota increased by 
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1% decreases the GDP growth rate by 0.29% in the same year. The estimations 
confirm a statistically significant negative effect of changes direct tax quota on GDP 
growth as well. A cut in the direct tax quota by 1% raises the GDP growth rate by 
0.43%. The model also presents a negative impact of corporate income taxes on GDP 
growth. The regression coefficient (–1.28%) expresses the high negative impact of an 
increase in the corporate income tax quota on GDP growth. On the other hand, the 
effect of social contribution quota changes on GDP growth is not statistically 
significant in any estimation.  
Although founded regression coefficients are relatively high, the changes in tax rates 
should not be regarded as a single tool affecting the economic growth, as the GDP 
growth is influenced by many factors. Nevertheless, values of adjusted the 
determination coefficient (approximately 30%) are relatively high due to the complex 
nature of GDP growth.  
 
SHRNUTÍ 
Daňové zatížení se v jednotlivých členských zemích Evropské unie liší strukturou i 
velikostí. Je otázkou, zda vlády svou aktivní politikou v oblasti zdanění mohou 
ovlivnit ekonomickou výkonnost země. Cílem článku je testovat statistickou 
významnost vlivu změn daňového zatížení na tempo růstu HDP. S ohledem na cíl 
práce byla použita jako základní metoda zkoumání panelová regrese s fixními efekty. 
Empirické šetření bylo provedeno na upravených ročních datech panelu 24 zemí 
Evropské unie v letech 1995–2008 (data o daňových kvótách byla adjustována, data o 
HDP cyklicky adjustována). První část obsahuje základní teoretické vazby mezi 
zdaněním a ekonomickým růstem a cíl práce. Druhá část představuje základní 
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literaturu a výsledky studií, které se věnují zdanění a ekonomické výkonnosti. Třetí 
část představuje metody a data použitá pro modelování statistické významnost vlivu 
změn daňového zatížení na tempo růstu HDP, které je obsahem čtvrté části práce. 
Model je koncipován ve třech variantách: nejprve je zkoumán vliv změn celkového 
daňového zatížení na tempo růstu HDP, dále je testován vliv změn daňové kvóty 
přímých a nepřímých daní a daňové kvóty sociálního pojištění a závěrem jsou 
analyzovány změny kvót osobních a firemních důchodových daní. Následuje srovnání 
výsledků s dříve prezentovanými studiemi.  
Empirické výsledky ukazují, že zvýšení daní má negativní vliv na růst HDP. Regresní 
koeficienty potvrzují závěry některých dříve prezentovaných studií. Výsledky testů 
potvrdily statisticky významný negativní vliv růstu daňového zatížení na ekonomický 
růst. Zvýšení celkové daňové kvóty o 1 % vede ke snížení tempa růstu HDP o 0,29 % 
ve stejném roce. Odhady také potvrdily statisticky významný záporný vliv kvóty 
přímých daní (snížení kvóty přímých daní o 1 % zvyšuje tempo růstu HDP o 0,43 %). 
Z odhadů také vyplývá, že zvýšení kvóty firemních důchodových daní snižuje tempo 
růstu HDP (hodnota regresního koeficientu je – 1,28 %). Na druhou stranu se 
neprokázala statistická významnost změn kvóty sociálního pojištění.  
Ačkoli zjištěné regresní koeficienty jsou poměrně vysoké, nemůže být změna 
daňového zatížení považována za jediný nástroj ovlivňující ekonomický růst, protože 
ten je ovlivněn mnoha faktory. Nicméně hodnota upraveného koeficientu determinace 
(přibližně 30 %) je vzhledem ke komplexnímu charakteru HDP poměrně vysoká. 
 
zdanění, daňové zatížení, ekonomický růst, panelová regrese 
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